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Abstract
We consider the generic robustness of an upper hemi-continuous solution
concept on a class of games of interest which has been embedded in a larger
space of games. We show that generic robustness follows if the class of games of
interest is \large" relative to the class of games in which it has been embedded.
This result is used to show why interim correlated rationalizable actions are
generically robust to players' hierarchies of beliefs as established by Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007) even without their richness condition. It is also used to
provide a formal sense according to which, in the setting of Kajii and Morris
(1997b), the set of representations of a complete information game is small
in the space of incomplete information games in which it is embedded. This
dierence in relative sizes makes the robustness problems of Kajii and Morris
(1997b) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) be incomparable and helps explaining
why their conclusions dier so signicantly.
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1 Introduction
Robustness problems abound in game theory. Amongst those robustness problems,
the one concerning the robustness of Nash equilibrium of complete information games
to incomplete information has received considerable attention. Specically, Kajii and
Morris (1997b), and Carlsson and van Damme (1993) before, have shown that some
Nash equilibria of some normal-form games are not robust to incomplete informa-
tion. This lack of robustness of Nash equilibrium of complete information games to
incomplete information is particularly striking because it holds for some strict Nash
equilibria, which were thought to be robust to all sorts of perturbations. Furthermore,
the lack of robustness of Nash equilibrium to incomplete information is robust in the
sense that it holds on an open subset of complete information games.
A quite dierent message arises from the robustness problem considered in Wein-
stein and Yildiz (2007). In contrast to the above robust lack of robustness of Nash
equilibrium to incomplete information, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) have shown that
interim correlated rationalizable actions are generically robust to players' beliefs. The
relevance of this result to those of Kajii and Morris (1997b) is that, while the entire
hierarchy of players' beliefs is not explicitly part of the notion of robustness used by
Kajii and Morris (1997b), players' beliefs are central to their analysis and results.
Thus, Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007) paper is a natural continuation of Kajii and
Morris's (1997b) work of analyzing the robustness of equilibria to incomplete infor-
mation. It is then surprising that Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) obtained a conclusion
that diers so signicantly from the one reached in Kajii and Morris (1997b).1 Why
is this?
In this paper, we provide a unied view on robustness problems. Specically,
we dene a robustness problem by a class of games of interest, a (topological) space
of games in which the former is embedded (the perturbation space, for short), a
1Dierent results arise when one focus on full (as opposed to generic) robustness. See Kajii
and Morris (1997a) and the references therein, and also Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), namely their
structure theorem (Proposition 1 in their paper). See also Ely and Peski (2011), Chen (2012), Penta
(2012) and Penta (2013) amongst others for further results.
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(metric) space where the solutions lie and a solution concept described by a (nonempty
and compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous) correspondence from the perturbation
space to the solution space. Using Fort's (1951) theorem on the generic continuity of
correspondences, we then show that if class of games of interest is non-meager in the
perturbation space, then the solution concept is continuous on a non-meager subset
of the class of games of interest. Moreover, if class of games of interest is dense in
the perturbation space, then the solution concept is continuous on a residual subset
of the class of games of interest. Our notion of a generic set in a topological space
is that of a residual set and, thus, we interpret the latter result as stating that the
solution concept is generically robust provided that the class of games of interest is
suciently large relative to the perturbation space.2
The above result reveals that the generic robustness result of Weinstein and Yildiz
(2007) holds because they focus on a class of games of interest that is large in the
space of perturbations. Indeed, this robustness problem is one where the perturba-
tion space consists of the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985). The
set of games (i.e. types) of interest is any dense subset of the universal type space
and, therefore, the generic robustness of interim correlated rationalizable actions to
hierarchies of players' beliefs follows from our abstract result. In fact, by exploring
the niteness of the strategy space, we show that the correspondence of interim cor-
related rationalizable action proles is locally constant in an open and dense subset
of any dense subset of the universal type space, thus extending an analogous result
of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by dispensing with their richness assumption.3
The (contrapositive of the) above result also shown that, in the setting of Kajii
2Chen and Xiong (2013) also refer to residual sets as generic sets. When the perturbation space
is a Baire space, then each of its residual subsets can be interpreted as being not small and as having
a small complement. See Section 2 for details.
3It is interesting to note that this result depends only on the upper hemi-continuity of the cor-
respondence of interim correlated rationalizable action proles and not on deeper properties of this
correspondence and of the universal type space. By exploring these deeper properties, Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007) obtained conclusions that are stronger than the generic robustness of the corre-
spondence of interim correlated rationalizable action proles; see below.
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and Morris (1997b), the set of representations of a complete information game is
small (meager and not dense) in the space of incomplete information games in which
the former set has been embedded. This is so not just at an intuitive level, but
also formally in the following sense: If the robustness problem is formalized such
that the solution correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and lower hemi-continuity
of the solution correspondence corresponds to Kajii and Morris's (1997b) notion of
robustness to incomplete information, then the set of games of interest must indeed
be small in the perturbation space whenever some Nash equilibrium of the given
complete information game fails to be robust to incomplete information. We show
that a formalization of the Kajii and Morris's (1997b) robustness problem that have
these properties exists.
The above consequences of our main result mean that the reason why the generic
robustness result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and the robust lack of robustness
result of Kajii and Morris (1997b) dier so signicantly lies, in part, on the dierence
in the size of the class of games of interest relative to the perturbation space in their
robustness problems. In particular, our results provide a sense in which the robustness
of a solution concept is independent of the actual space where this robustness exercise
is performed, namely whether the perturbation space is a space of priors as in Kajii
and Morris (1997b) or a space of hierarchies of beliefs as in Weinstein and Yildiz
(2007), but rather depends on the topological properties of the class of games of
interest as a subset of the perturbation space.
We emphasize that the focus of this paper is on the generic robustness of solution
concepts and, in particular, on the implications of the results in Kajii and Morris
(1997b) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) for this issue. It is worth mentioning that
Kajii and Morris (1997b) went well beyond showing that some Nash equilibria of some
normal-form games are not robust to incomplete information, namely, by obtaining
a classication of which games of complete information are robust to incomplete
information. Likewise, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) went well beyond establishing the
generic robustness of interim correlated rationalizable actions. In fact, they obtained
the generic uniqueness of interim correlated rationalizable actions from which generic
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robustness follows. In fact, they have shown that, for each possible action prole, each
point of multiplicity is the limit point of a sequence of points have that action prole
as a unique solution. As already suggested in Footnote 1, our paper has nothing to
say on these results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our setting and our
result on generic robustness. This result is then applied in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 to the
robustness problems of Kajii and Morris (1997b) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007).
Some concluding remarks, including open questions motivated by the above results
are in Section 3. The proofs of our results are in the Appendix.
2 Generic robustness
In this section, we present the notion of a generic set that we use and our result on
generic robustness in an abstract setting. This setting is then specialized in Sections
2.1 and 2.2.
Let X be a topological space. A subset T of X is nowhere dense in X if
int(cl(T )) = ; and it is meager in X if it is a countable union of nowhere dense
sets.4 A set T  X is non-meager in X if it is not meager in X and is residual in
X if it is the complement of a meager set in X. The space X is said to be a Baire
space if every nonempty open set in X is non-meager.5 Note that each residual set in
a nonempty Baire space X is non-meager since, otherwise, X would be a nonempty
open meager set. Hence, intuitively, a residual set in a nonempty Baire space has a
\small" complement and is itself not \small". For these reasons, whenever A  X is
residual in X, we also say that A is generic in X (in this case, we also say that A is
a generic subset of X).
With the above notion of a generic set, we proceed to the notion of generic ro-
4Given a subset A of a topological space, int(A) denotes the interior of A, cl(A) the closure of A
and Ac the complement of A.
5See Bourbaki (1966, p. 192) for several equivalent denitions of a Baire space. Recall that
Baire's category theorem assets that every complete pseudo-metric space is a Baire space (see e.g.
Kelley (1955, Theorem 34, p. 200)).
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bustness. A robustness problem is described by a space of games X, assumed to be
a topological space, a class of games in X described by a subset A of X, a solu-
tion space S, assumed to be a metric space, and a solution concept described by a
correspondence 	 : X  S, where 	 is assumed to be upper hemi-continuous with
nonempty and compact values. The notion of a robustness problem covers situation
where one is interested in a class A of games which is embedded in a larger space X,
interpreted as a space of perturbations, and the solution correspondence 	 is upper
hemi-continuous with nonempty and compact values (the typical case in many ap-
plications). The robustness issue is whether or not 	 is also lower hemi-continuous.
We then say that (the solution concept described by) 	 is generically robust on A
relative to X if 	 is continuous on a generic subset of A.6
We also use the following notion of robustness: 	 is weakly robust on A relative to
X if 	 is continuous on a non-meager subset of A. Note that, whenever A (endowed
with the relative topology induced by the topology of X) is a Baire space, weak
robustness on A relative to X is indeed a weaker notion than generic robustness
on A relative to X. While we require neither X nor A to be a Baire space in the
formal denition of a robustness problem, X is, in fact, a Baire space in all the
robustness problems we consider, the same holding regarding A except possibly in
the robustness problem of Corollary 2 below when A is merely a dense subset of X.
Hence, as discussed above, generic sets are non-meager in these spaces.
The following result provides sucient conditions on A for 	 to be weakly and
generic robust on A relative to X. It is largely a consequence of Fort's (1951) theorem
on the generic continuity of correspondences.7
Theorem 1 Let (X;A; S;	) be a robustness problem.
6Note that the space X matter for this denition because it is the domain of 	. In fact, a quite
dierent notion of generic robustness would result if only the restriction of 	 to A was required to
be continuous.
7Fort's (1951) theorem is widely used to address the essentiality of Nash equilibrium in discontin-
uous games. See, e.g. Carbonell-Nicolau (2010) and Scalzo (2013); see also Carmona (2013, Chapter
5) for a survey of this literature.
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1. If A is non-meager in X, then 	 is weakly robust on A relative to X.
2. If A is dense in X, then 	 is generically robust on A relative to X.
3. If S is nite and A is dense (resp. non-meager) in X, then there exists an open
and dense (resp. non-meager) subset O of A such that 	 is locally constant on
O.8
Theorem 1 implies that the solution concept 	 in a robustness problems is (gener-
ically or weakly) robust provided that the class A of games of interest is suciently
large in the space X of perturbations. For weak robustness, it suces that A be
non-meager in X and, for generic robustness, that A be dense in X (which holds,
in particular, if X is a Baire space and A is generic in X). Furthermore, a stronger
conclusion is obtained in the case where the solution space is nite, namely that the
solution correspondence is locally constant in an open subset of the class A of games
of interest; this open set is dense in A if A is dense in X and non-meager in A if A is
non-meager in X.
2.1 Robustness to incomplete information
In this section, we consider the robustness of the Nash equilibria of a given complete
information game to incomplete information as in Kajii and Morris (1997b).
A nite normal-form game G = (Ci; gi)i2N consists of a nite set N of players
and, for each player i 2 N , a nonempty, nite pure-strategy space Ci and a payo
function gi : C ! R, where C =
Q
i2N Ci. Let, for each nite set B, (B) = fy 2
RjBj+ :
P
b2B yb = 1g and Si = (Ci) denote the set of player i's mixed strategies for
each i 2 N . Throughout the paper, subsets of Euclidean spaces are endowed with
the sup norm, i.e. jjxjj = supk=1;:::;m jxkj whenever x 2 Rm. Dene S =
Q
i2N Si,
s(c) =
Q
i2N si(ci) and gi(s) =
P
c2C s(c)gi(c) for each i 2 N , c 2 C and s 2 S, where
si(ci) denotes the probability that ci is played under si. The symbol  i denotes \all
8I.e. for each x 2 O, there exists an open neighborhood U of x in A such that 	(x0) = 	(x) for
each x0 2 U .
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players but i" and S i =
Q
j 6=i Sj denotes the set of mixed strategy proles for all
players but i. A Nash equilibrium of G is s 2 S such that gi(s)  gi(si; s i) for all
i 2 N and si 2 Si.
Let G = (Ci; gi)i2N be a xed nite normal-form game. The game G is embedded
in a space of incomplete information games as follows. Each incomplete information
game in this space is dened by the xed player setN , the xed action sets C1; : : : ; Cn,
a countable state space 
, a probability measure P on 
 and, for each i 2 N , a
bounded state dependent payo function ui : C  
 ! R and a partition Qi of 

such that P (Qi(!)) > 0 for all ! 2 
, where Qi(!) is the unique element of Qi
containing !. Let E(G) be the set of all such incomplete information games whose
payo functions are bounded by a common constant.
Let U = (
; P; (Ci; ui;Qi)i2N) 2 E(G). A mixed strategy for player i 2 N is a
Qi-measurable function i : 
 ! (Ci). Let i(cij!) denote the probability that ci
is played given ! under i for each i 2 N , ci 2 Ci and ! 2 
. Furthermore, let
 = (1; : : : ; n), (cj!) =
Q
i2N i(cij!) and ui((!); !) =
P
c2C (cj!)ui(c; !) for
each i 2 N , c 2 C and ! 2 
. Let P (!jQi(!)) = P (!)=P (Qi(!)) be the conditional
probability of state ! given information set Qi(!) for each i 2 N and ! 2 
. We say
that  is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of U ifX
!02Qi(!)
P (!0jQi(!))ui((!0); !0) 
X
!02Qi(!)
P (!0jQi(!))ui((ci;  i(!0)); !0)
for all i 2 N , ci 2 Ci and ! 2 
. Furthermore, an equilibrium action distribution
of U is  2 (C) such that, for some Bayesian Nash equilibrium  of U , (c) =P
!2
 (cj!)P (!) for each c 2 C. We say that  2 (C) is an Nash equilibrium
action distribution of G if, for some Nash equilibrium  of G, (c) = (c) for each
c 2 C (i.e. (c) =Qi2N i(ci)).
The notion of robustness of a Nash equilibrium of G to incomplete information is
dened as follows. For each U = (
; P; (Ci; ui;Qi)i2N) 2 E(G), let

U = f! 2 
 : ui(c; !0) = gi(c) for all c 2 C; !0 2 Qi(!) and i 2 Ng:
For each " 2 [0; 1], we say that U 2 E(G) is an "-elaboration of G if P (
U) = 1   "
and let E(G; ") be the set of all "-elaborations of G. Finally, we say that an action
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distribution  2 (C) is robust to incomplete information in G if, for every  > 0,
there exists " > 0 such that, for all 0  "  ", every U 2 E(G; ") has an equilibrium
action distribution  such that jj  jj  .
The above notion of robustness to incomplete information is now expressed in
terms of a robustness problems as dened in Section 2. The space X of games is
E(G), S is the (metric) space (C) of action distributions, and A is the set of 0-
elaborations of G, i.e. A = E(G; 0).
We want to specify the remaining elements, the solution correspondence 	 and the
topology  on X, such that (X;A; S;	) is a robustness problem that reects Kajii
and Morris's (1997b) notion of robustness to incomplete information, in the sense
that the lower hemi-continuity of 	 at some U 2 A implies that all Nash equilibrium
action distributions of G are robust to incomplete information. Theorem 2 asserts
that this can be done and in way that (a) A is meager and non-dense in X (meaning
that the set of representations of the complete information game G as 0-elaborations
of G is small in the space of incomplete information games E(G)) and (b) both X
and A are Baire spaces (meaning that residual sets are non-meager).
Theorem 2 There is a correspondence 	 : X  S and a topology  on X such that
1. (X;A; S;	) is a robustness problem that reects Kajii and Morris's (1997b)
notion of robustness to incomplete information,
2. A is closed and nowhere dense in X, and
3. Both X (endowed with ) and A (endowed with its relative topology induced by
) are Baire spaces.
Theorem 2 shows that it is possible to formulate a robustness problem that reects
Kajii and Morris's (1997b) notion of robustness to incomplete information in which A
is small relative to X, i.e. A is both meager and non-dense in X. The main point of
this section is that, when game G is such that not all of its Nash equilibrium action
distributions are robust to incomplete information, A is necessarily small relative
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to X in any robustness problem that reects Kajii and Morris's (1997b) notion of
robustness to incomplete information.9
Corollary 1 Let G be such that not all of its Nash equilibrium action distributions
are robust to incomplete information,  0 be a topology on X and 	0 : X  S be a
correspondence.
If, when X is endowed with  0, (X;A; S;	0) is a robustness problem that reects
Kajii and Morris's (1997b) notion of robustness to incomplete information, then A
is a meager and non-dense subset of X.
Corollary 1 is a simple consequence of Theorem 1. Indeed, because (X;A; S;	0)
reects Kajii and Morris's (1997b) notion of robustness to incomplete information, it
follows that 	 is not continuous at U for all U 2 A. Hence, 	 is neither weakly nor
generically robust on A relative to X. By Theorem 1, this can occur only when A is
a meager and non-dense subset of X, i.e. a game G is meager and non-dense (and,
hence, non-generic) in the space of all incomplete information games in which it is
embedded.
In the context of this section, one may want to test the robustness to incomplete
information of the solution, described by 	, of games that may be of incomplete
information. That this can be done is an easy consequence of Theorem 1. Indeed,
if (X;A; S;	) is a robustness problem, A is meager in X and X is a Baire space,
then 	 is generically robust on X and on Ac, both relative to X (this follows because
both X and Ac are dense in X). In addition, this conclusion can be reached even
when one wishes to consider a solution concept  which is not necessarily upper
hemi-continuous at points of A; for instance, this happens when, in the context of
this session,  is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium correspondence (see the proof of
Theorem 2).
9In particular, this means that the conclusion that A is meager and non-dense in X that follows
from part 2 of Theorem 2 does not depend on the particular choices for 	 and  we made in its
proof.
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Remark 1 If (X;A; S;	) is a robustness problem, A is closed and meager in X, and
 : X  S is such that (x)  	(x) for each x 2 X and (x) = 	(x) for each
x 2 Ac, then  is generically robust on X and on Ac, both relative to X.
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that 	 and the topology  on X can be chosen such
that all of the assumptions of Remark 1 are satised (and in a way that the robust-
ness problem reects Kajii and Morris's (1997b) notion of robustness to incomplete
information) when  is the correspondence of the (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium action
distributions. More generally, for any such choice of 	 and  such that all of the as-
sumptions of Remark 1 hold, Remark 1 then implies that Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of incomplete information games is generically robust to incomplete information.
2.2 Robustness to hierarchies of beliefs
We next consider the problem of robustness of interim correlated rationalizable actions
to hierarchies of players' beliefs following Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). The setting
is described by a nite set N of players, a parameter space , assumed to be a
compact metric space, and, for each i 2 N , a nite action space Ci and a continuous
payo function ui : 
  C ! R. We consider the set of games that dier in their
specication of the belief structure on , here described by dierent types in the
universal type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985). Thus, in this setting, the type
space of each player i 2 N is the universal type space T i consisting of all belief
hierarchies for which it is common knowledge that the beliefs are coherent.
A brief description of the universal type space T i of player i 2 N is as follows; see
Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) for details. Due to
the underlying uncertainty reected in , each player has beliefs over  (his rst-
order beliefs), beliefs over the beliefs of other players (second-order beliefs) and so on.
Each type ti 2 T i consists of one such hierarchy of beliefs. For each compact metric
spaceK, letM(K) denote the space of Borel probability measures onK endowed with
the narrow topology,10 and dene the sets (Y0; Y1; : : :) and (M1;M2; : : :) by Y0 = 
,
10Recall that the narrow topology on M(X) is dened to be the smallest topology on M(K)
11
Mk = M(Yk 1) and Yk = Yk 1  (Mk)n =  
Qk
l=1(Ml)
n for all k 2 N. We
then have that the universal type space T i of player i is a subset of
Q1
k=0M(Yk),
which is endowed with the relative topology induced from the product topology ofQ1
k=0M(Yk). Let T
 =
Q
i2N T

i . For each i 2 N and ti 2 T i , let ti 2 M(  T  i)
be the unique probability measure that represents the beliefs of ti about (; t i).
The set of interim correlated rationalizable actions for each type ti 2 T i of player
i 2 N is dened as follows. Let S0i (ti) = Ci for all i 2 N and ti 2 T i and, for each
k 2 N, assume that S1i (ti); : : : ; Sk 1i (ti) have been dened for all i 2 N and ti 2 T i .
For each i 2 N and ti 2 T i , let Sk 1 i (t i) =
Q
j 6=i S
k 1
j (tj) and dene S
k
i (ti) to be the
set of ci 2 Ci with the property that there exists  2 M(  T  i  C i) such that
(a) the marginal of  on   T  i is ti , (b) (f(; t i; c i) 2   T  i  C i : c i 2
Sk 1 i (t i)g) = 1 and (c) ci solves
max
c0i2Ci
Z
C i
ui(; c
0
i; c i)d
0(; c i);
where 0 is the marginal of  on C i. The set of interim correlated rationalizable
actions for type ti 2 T i of player i 2 N is S1i (ti) =
T1
k=0 S
k
i (ti). Let, for each t 2 T ,
S1(t) =
Q
i2N S
1
i (ti).
We dene a robustness problem by letting X = T , A be a dense subset in T ,
S = C and 	(t) = S1(t) for each t 2 T . Since X is a topological space (and
also a Baire space since it is a compact metric space by Mertens and Zamir (1985,
Theorem 2.9)), S is a metric space and 	 is upper hemi-continuous with nonempty
and compact values (see Weinstein and Yildiz (2017, Proposition 1)), it then follows
from Theorem 1 that 	 is generically robust on A relative to X and, in fact, locally
constant in an open and dense subset of A.
Corollary 2 Let X, S and 	 be as dened above and A be a dense subset of X.
Then there exists an open and dense subset O of A such that 	 is locally constant on
O.
for which all functions of the form  7! R
K
fd are continuous, where f : K ! R is bounded
and continuous (see Fremlin (2003, 437J, p. 229)). It is also known as the topology of the weak
convergence of probability measures and as the weak topology.
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Corollary 2 states that interim correlated rationalizable actions are generically
robust in a strong sense in the universal type space relative to itself and, also, in
any dense subset of the universal type space relative to the universal type space.11 It
reaches a conclusion analogous to those of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 in Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007), which also asserted that 	 is locally constant in an open and dense
subset of A for any dense subset A of X, while dispensing with their richness assump-
tion (Assumption 1 in their paper). However, without this richness assumption, we
do not obtain the conclusion in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 in Weinstein and Yildiz
(2007) that 	 is locally unique.12;13
The above conclusion contrasts with the one obtained in Section 2.1. While there
are many dierences between the respective robustness problems, an important one
concerns the set A of games. Indeed, in Section 2.1, A is meager and non-dense in
the perturbation space X in which A is embedded, whereas in Corollary 2 above, A
is a dense subset of X. This dierence is important because were A dense in X in
the robustness problem of Section 2.1, then 	 would then be generically robust on A
relative to X. This dierence makes the robustness problems in Sections 2.1 and 2.2
be incomparable as far as the generic robustness of the solution concept is concerned
and helps explaining why their conclusions dier signicantly.
11Two dense subsets of the universal type space that are of special interest are the set of nite
types and the set of nite types consistent with the common-prior assumption. See Weinstein and
Yildiz (2007) for details; the denseness of each of these two sets was originally established by Mertens
and Zamir (1985) and Lipman (2003) respectively.
12Corollary 2 with A = X = T  implies Theorem 3 in Ely and Peski (2011), which roughly states
that the set of \regular" types contain an open and dense set. Indeed, it is easy to see that if ti 2 T i
is such that S1i (ti) is locally constant, then ti is regular.
13In the terminology of Chen, Takahashi, and Xiong (2014), Corollary 2 states that, for each t in
a open dense subset of T , S1i (ti) (and, in fact, any nonempty subset of it) is a robust prediction
for type ti of player i 2 N . See their paper for details and for a characterization of fully (as opposed
to generically) robust predictions.
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3 Concluding remarks
We have provided a unied view on several robustness problems by dening an ab-
stract notion of a robustness problem. We then showed that the generic robustness
of the solution concept follows if the class of games of interest is dense in the space
of games in which it is embedded. This result implies that the interim correlated
rationalizable action proles are generically robust to players' hierarchies of beliefs in
the setting of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007).
We have also shown that, in the setting of Kajii and Morris (1997b), the set of
representations of a complete information game is small (meager and not dense) in the
space of incomplete information games in which the former set has been embedded.
This result and the one above together mean that the generic robustness result of
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and the robust lack of robustness result of Kajii and
Morris (1997b) are incomparable, and help explaining why their conclusions dier so
signicantly.
The robustness problem of Kajii and Morris (1997b) can be made comparable to
that of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by taking in the latter the space of incomplete
information games to be the class of games of interest. In this case, the class of games
of interest is large relative to the perturbation space and thus we obtained the generic
robustness of Bayesian Nash equilibrium to incomplete information. Thus, when the
two results are made comparable, their conclusion are analogous.
To strengthen the above view, it would be interesting to consider a robustness
problem analogous to the one of Kajii and Morris (1997b) in the setting of Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007) in the following sense. Consider the robustness problem where the
class of games of interest is the set of complete information games. Moreover, let this
set be dened by requiring an element of the parameter space to have probability one
and for this to be commonly known. Formally, consider the set A of types t in the
universal type space T  such that, for some parameter  in the parameter space ,
ti = (1 ; 1(;(1 ;:::;1 )); : : :) for each player i 2 N .14 Letting X be the universal type
14For any compact metric space K and any x 2 K, 1x is the element in M(K) that assigns
14
space and 	 : X  S be the correspondence of the interim correlated rationalizable
actions as in Section 2.2, we can ask: Does 	 fail to be generically robust on A? As
A is, in this case, meager (nowhere dense in fact) and not dense in X, Theorem 1
does not apply and we leave this as an open question.15 More generally, this leads
to another open question: When (X;A; S;	) is a robustness problem, what can be
said, in general, regarding the generic robustness of 	 on A relative to X when A is
meager and not dense in X?
Additional open questions are: Does Theorem 1 hold when a stronger notion of
genericity (say, open and dense as in Corollary 2) is used in the denition of generic
robustness? Can a general characterization of the points of discontinuity be given?
Can generic robustness results be obtained when the solution correspondence is not
upper hemi-continuous?
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let (X;A; S;	) be a robustness problem. By Fort's theorem (see Fort (1951, Theorem
2)), there exists a generic set R in X such that 	 is continuous on R.
Before turning to the proof of the rst and second parts of the theorem, note that
a set is meager if and only if it is contained in a countable union of closed sets each
of which has no interior points. Hence, a set is generic if and only if it contains a
countable intersection of open dense sets.
probability one to x.
15Under Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007) richness assumption, the question can be reformulated as
follows. Let U = ft 2 T  : jS1(t)j = 1g be the set of type proles with unique rationalizable action
proles. Then U is open and dense in X by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007, Proposition 2); hence, U \A
is open in A. The question is then whether or not U \A is dense in A. The denseness of U \A in A
may fail (I am thankful to an anonymous referee for this argument): Let  = [0; 1]NC so that 
corresponds to a prole of payo functions. Consider an open neighborhood of a  corresponding
to the payo function prole of a coordination game. We then obtain a nonempty open subset of A
contained in the complement of U .
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Suppose that A is non-meager in X and suppose, in order to reach a contradiction,
that A \ R is meager in A. Then, by Bourbaki (1966, Proposition 2, p. 191) and
the comments following Denition 2 in Bourbaki (1966, p. 192), A \ R is meager in
X. Since A \ Rc  Rc and Rc is meager in X, then A \ Rc is meager in X. Thus,
A = (A \ R) [ (A \ Rc) is meager in X, a contradiction. This shows that A \ R is
non-meager in A and established the rst part of the theorem.
Suppose next that A is dense in X. Since R is generic in X, let fOkg1k=1 be a
countable family of open dense sets in X such that
T1
k=1Ok  R. Since A is dense in
X and Ok is open and dense in X, then A\Ok is dense in A for each k 2 N. Indeed,
if x 2 A\Ock and U is an open neighborhood of x in X, there exists y 2 Ok \U since
Ok is dense in X and, as Ok \ U is an open neighborhood of y and A is dense in X,
there exists z 2 A\Ok \U . It follows that fA\Okg1k=1 is a countable family of open
dense sets in A such that
T1
k=1(A\Ok)  A\R, which implies that A\R is generic
in A.
Finally, consider the case where S is nite. Note that R is dense in X. Since
	 is continuous on R and S is nite, then, for each ~x 2 R, there exists an open
neighborhood O~x of ~x such that 	(x
0) = 	(~x) for all x0 2 O~x. Dene ~O =
S
~x2RO~x
and note that ~O is open (clearly) and dense (since R  ~O and R is dense in X).
Let O = A \ ~O. Then O is open in A and, as above, O dense (resp. non-meager)
in A if A is dense (resp. non-meager) in X. Furthermore, for each x 2 O, then x 2 O~x
for some ~x 2 R and, hence, 	(x) = 	(~x) = 	(x0) for all x0 2 O~x and, hence, for all
x0 2 A \O~x. Thus, U = A \O~x is the desired open neighborhood of x in A.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We start by dening the solution correspondence 	 : X  S: For each U 2 X, let
	(U) =
8<: f 2 (C) :  is a correlated equilibrium of Gg if U 2 A;f 2 (C) :  is an equilibrium action distribution of Ug otherwise:
Recall that a correlated equilibrium of G is  2 (C) such that, for each i 2 N and
ci; c
0
i 2 Ci,
P
c i2C i gi(ci; c i)(ci; c i) 
P
c i2C i gi(c
0
i; c i)(ci; c i).
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We next dene a topology on X by specifying the neighborhood system B(U) of
each point U in X as follows. For each U 2 Ac, let B(U) = fB  X : U 2 Bg,
i.e. B(U) coincides with the neighborhood system of U in the discrete topology.16
Let B(0) be the neighborhood system of 0 in [0; 1], the latter endowed with its usual
topology. Then, for each U 2 A, let B(U) be the collection of subsets B of X such
that
S
"2O E(G; ")  B for some O 2 B(0). Let  be the topology generated by this
neighborhood system.
We now show that the three properties in the statement of Theorem 2 hold. We
start by showing that  is a topology on X, which follows once we establish the
following properties for each U 2 X (see Bourbaki (1966)): (a) if B 2 B(U) and
B0  B then B0 2 B(U), (b) if B 2 B(U) and B0 2 B(U) then B \ B0 2 B(U), (c)
U 2 B for each B 2 B(U), and (d) for each B 2 B(U), there exists B0 2 B(U) such
that B 2 B(U 0) for all U 0 2 B0. All of these properties are clear when U 2 Ac and so
are (a) and (c) in the case U 2 A. Thus, assume that U 2 A.
We next show that (b) holds. LetB 2 B(U) andB0 2 B(U), and letO1; O2 2 B(0)
be such that
S
"2O1 E(G; ")  B and
S
"2O2 E(G; ")  B0. Then
S
"2O1\O2 E(G; ")  S
"2O1 E(G; ")
 \  S"2O2 E(G; ")  B \ B0 and, thus, B \ B0 2 B(U). Finally
note that (e) holds. Indeed, let B 2 B(U) and dene B0 = B. Then it follows that
B 2 B(U 0) for each U 0 2 B0.
The above shows that X is a topological space when endowed with  . To es-
tablish part 1, we rst show that 	 is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty and
compact values. That 	 has nonempty and compact values follows from standard
arguments. Note that X is rst countable since fUg is a countable local base for
each U 2 Ac and, letting C(0) be a countable local base of 0 in [0; 1], it follows thatS
"2O E(G; ") : O 2 C(0)
	
is a countable local base of U for each U 2 A. We have
that 	 is upper hemicontinuous at U 2 Ac since U is an isolated point of X. Fur-
thermore, for each U 2 A, since X is rst countable, it follows by Kajii and Morris
(1997b, Corollary 3.5) that 	 is upper hemicontinuous at U .
16Thus, we are making each U 2 Ac be an isolated point in X. This choice is made by simplicity
since the robustness question being analysed is independent of what happens around a given U 2 Ac.
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To complete the proof of part 1, we now show that (X;A; S;	) reects Kajii and
Morris's (1997b) notion of robustness to incomplete information. Let U 2 A be such
that 	 is lower hemicontinuous at U ,  be a Nash equilibrium action distribution of
G and  > 0. Then, for some V 2 B(U), 	(U 0) \ B() 6= ; for all U 0 2 V , where
B() denotes the ball of radius  around . Hence, there exists O 2 B(0) and, in
fact, "0 > 0 such that
S
"2[0;"0)E(G; ") 
S
"2O E(G; ")  V . Letting " = "0=2 > 0,
we have that, for all 0  "  ", every U 2 E(G; ") n A has an equilibrium action
distribution  such that jj  jj < . Furthermore, and clearly, every U 2 A has an
equilibrium action distribution  such that jj   jj < , namely  = . Thus,  is
robust to incomplete information.
We next prove part 2. It is clear that A is closed since, for each U 62 A, fUg 2
B(U) and fUg\A = ;. Furthermore, A has an empty interior since each neighborhood
of each U 2 A contains E(G; ") for some " > 0 and, hence, intersects Ac. Thus, A is
nowhere dense and, hence, meager. Furthermore, A is not dense in X since, for each
U 2 Ac, fUg is an open neighborhood of U and fUg \ A = ;.
Finally, we prove part 3. First, note that Ac is dense. Indeed, for each U 2 A
and B 2 B(U), let O 2 B(0) be such that U 2 ["2OE(G; ") and let "0 > 0 be such
that "0 2 O. Then, let U 0 2 E(G; "0) and note that U 0 2 Ac \ B. Second, to show
that X is a Baire space, note that it suces to show that if a subset V of X is a
countable intersection of open dense subsets of X, then V is dense in X (see Bourbaki
(1966, p. 192)). To this end, let Vk be an open dense subset of X for each k 2 N
and V =
T1
k=1 Vk. For each k 2 N, we have that Ac  Vk since Vk is dense and each
element of Ac is isolated. Hence, Ac  V and, since Ac is dense in X, so is V .
We next prove that A is a Baire space. First note that the relative topology of
A is the indiscrete topology. In fact, if V is a nonempty open subset of A, then
V = A \ V 0 for some open V 0 in X. Since V is nonempty, then V 0 2 B(U) for some
U 2 A and, hence, S"2O E(G; ")  V 0 for some O 2 B(0). Since A  S"2O E(G; "),
then A \ V 0 = A, i.e. V = A. Since the relative topology of A is the indiscrete
topology, it follows that A is the unique nonempty open set in A, that the empty set
is the unique nowhere dense set in A, that A is non-meager and, hence, that A is a
18
Baire space. This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Remark 1
Let (X;A; S;	) and  be as in the statement of the remark. Let R be residual in X
and such that 	 is continuous on R. Since A is closed, we have that Rc is meager
both in Ac and in X (see Bourbaki (1966, p. 192) for the former). Thus, R \ Ac is
residual both in Ac and in X. As 	 is continuous on R \ Ac and (x) = 	(x) for
each x 2 Ac, it follows that  is generically robust on X and on Ac, both relative to
X.
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